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Abstract
In this paper, we aim to study the behaviour of the au-
tonomous adaptive agents in sequential Vickrey auctions
with homogeneous goods. We describe how to revise these
adaptive agents, including ZI-C, ZIP, GD, and AA. The per-
formance of these agents is evaluated by two sets of experi-
ments. It turns out that truth-telling is not a dominant strat-
egy; when it is easy for all the buyer agents to buy their
goods, one should not tell his true value; when it is difficult
to buy, one should not submit a random value; the perfor-
mance of adaptive agents, such as ZIP and GD, is very good
but cannot be guaranteed to be the best in various market
environments. Through another set of experiments, the re-
sults demonstrate that AA agents perform very well com-
pared with the truth-telling agents and agents using other
adaptive bidding strategies.
1 Introduction
Today, several auction mechanisms have been widely
employed in electronic commerce, such as English auction,
Vickrey auction, continuous double auction, etc. The Vick-
rey auction is well-known for the existence of the dominant
strategy which is truth telling [8]. In our work, each Vick-
rey auction is assumed to sell one unit of the homogeneous
goods. In order to relieve the burden of human traders in
more and more complicated auctions, software agents are
highly needed, which are representatives of human traders
to achieve the humans’ goals [11]. The dominant strategy
(the best strategy to take, no matter what the others take) for
an agent to adopt in such a single Vickrey auction is to bid
his true value.
Auction designers have researched on the fundamental
value of deadline in an auction mechanism and have applied
it to many electronic commerce applications, such as eBay
and Amazon [4] [5] [1]. In many real world situations it
is essential to conclude a negotiation among agents within
a fixed deadline. Aimed to resemble those practical mar-
ket environments, in our Vickrey auction, there is a fixed
deadline to regulate when the auction will finish. There-
fore agents in such Vickrey auctions can count the time
and submit their (sealed) bids when they want. After this
single Vickrey auction is finished, another Vickrey auction
will start because there may have more than one seller who
wants to sell their goods in Vickrey auctions.
Many work has been done to design adaptive agents in
continuous double auctions (CDAs), such as ZI-C [7], GD
[6], ZIP [3], and AA [10]. Recently, Bagnall and Toft [2]
have revised GD, ZIP, and ZI-C to be applied to the first
price sealed bid (FPSB) auctions and second price sealed
bid (SPSB or Vickrey) auctions. However, they have not
described the revisions of AA agents nor compared the per-
formance of AA agents with other agents. They have not
analyzed the performance of various adaptive agents in dy-
namic market environments where supply and demand are
fluctuating from time to time. Nevertheless, in real mar-
kets, the supply and the demand may change because peo-
ple come and go. In addition, they have assumed each agent
is aware of the number of competitive agents in the same
market, which is usually unknown for markets in real life.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the other existing
literature on Vickrey auctions gives a systematic treatment
of adopting adaptive agents designed for continuous double
auctions into sequential Vickrey auctions in dynamic mar-
ket environments. However, it is possible to revise all these
adaptive agents and enable them to learn through repeated
competition in the sequential Vickrey auctions. More in-
teresting questions are raised related to sequential Vickrey
auctions. What is the performance of the truth-telling agents
in the dynamic sequential Vickrey auctions? What is the
performance of the revised adaptive agents when AA agents
are included or not included in such market environments?
Is it beneficial for agents to behave adaptively?
In order to answer the above questions, two sets of ex-
periments are designed and carried out. In the first set of
experiments, the performance of agents using the dominant
strategies is compared with that of ZI-C, ZIP, and GD which
are widely adopted in the literature. Therefore all these
different agents are put together in the sequential Vickrey
auction market. Later, AA strategy has been designed by
Ma and Leung [10] for continuous double auctions and for
sequential English auctions [9], which is formed based on
eagerness and a set of heuristic rules with thresholds. Ea-
gerness aims to simulate the feeling of a human trader in a
sequence of repeated competition. In the sequential Vick-
rey auctions, eagerness can be naturally generated. There-
fore, AA agents should be tested in the sequential Vickrey
auctions as well. Both experimental results show that truth-
telling is not a dominant strategy; when it is difficult to buy
for all the buyers, ZI-C agents perform worse than agents
using ZIP, GD, AA, and the truth-telling. In particular, ex-
perimental results of the second set of experiments show
that AA agents performance very well compared with other
adaptive agents and the agents using the truth-telling strat-
egy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
section 2, the sequential Vickrey auctions with homoge-
neous goods are described and related work is given. Sec-
tion 3 describes how to revise the adaptive agents for contin-
uous double auctions into the sequential Vickrey auctions.
In section 4, the performance of ZI-C, ZIP, GD, and the
dominant strategy is compared. AA strategy is then added
into the experiments and experimental evaluation is given.
Our conclusion and future work are presented in section 5.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Sequential Vickrey Auctions with Ho-
mogeneous Goods
A single Vickrey auction is a market where multiple buy-
ers desire to buy one unit of goods and each buyer only has
one chance to submit his bid in a sealed envelope to the
auctioneer. The auctioneer starts the auction by announc-
ing of the lowest acceptable price, denoted as Plowest. All
the rational buyers should submit their bids higher than or
equal to the value of Plowest. Otherwise, their bids will be
ignored by the auctioneer.
For each unit of goods that a buyer desires to buy, there
is a reservation price, above which a rational buyer will not
buy the unit. The auction ends when all the buyers have
submitted their bids. The buyer who placed the highest bid
is the winner while paying the second highest bid submitted
by others.
In a single Vickrey auction, only one unit of goods can be
traded. If there are more sellers who want to sell their units
of homogeneous goods, another Vickrey auction will begin
after this Vickrey auction. The buyer which has traded suc-
cessfully in the previous Vickrey auction will not join the
later Vickrey auctions. All the rest buyers will continue to
submit their bids in the later Vickrey auctions. A round
is the trading period from the beginning of a single Vick-
rey auction to the end of this Vickrey auction. Within each
round, at most one unit of goods is traded. When all the
sellers have traded their units of homogeneous goods, a run
is terminated. A run refers to the period for all the sellers to
trade one after another.
2.2 The Dominant Strategy in a Single
Vickrey Auction
In a single Vickrey auction, the dominant strategy is to
bid his true reservation price to the auctioneer, denoted as
Sdomi.
2.3 Bidding Strategies in CDAs
The research into the design and analysis of bidding
strategies for agents in CDAs started from early experimen-
tal economics work. Some representatives are selected to
discuss below.
Gode and Sunder [7] proposed the first bidding strategies
adopted by agents, ZI with Constraint (ZI-C) and ZI Un-
constrained (ZI-U). A ZI-C buyer submits a bid which is a
random value, larger than the lower range of the market and
less than the reservation price of this unit of the good. ZI-C
agents are widely adopted as benchmark agents because of
their simplicity during implementation.
Cliff and Bruten [3] further designed “zero-intelligence-
plus” (ZIP) agents by employing an elementary form of ma-
chine learning and a set of heuristic rules. Each ZIP agent
has a profit margin which determines the difference between
the agent’s reservation price and the ask or bid submitted.
The main idea is that if there was a transaction in the last
round, the agent would increase his profit margin in the cur-
rent round if his desired bid was higher than the transaction
price. If there was no transaction, the agent would decrease
his profit margin in the current round.
Gjerstad and Dickhaut [6] proposed a more sophisticated
bidding strategy utilizing two belief functions, often re-
ferred to as GD. A GD agent records all the asks and bids
in the history occurring in the last several rounds. From the
history, an agent computes a subjective belief of a bid or ask
being accepted. The agent can then calculate the expected
utility of the bid or ask. The bid or ask corresponding to
the highest expected utility is submitted to the market. By
utilizing the subjective belief, the agent is sensitive to the
fluctuation of the dynamic market all the time.
Recently, Ma and Leung [10] have proposed an adaptive
attitude (AA) bidding strategy for agents in CDA markets.
The AA strategy exploits both the short term and the long
term attitudes of an agent, and utilizes a threshold based
method with heuristic rules in bid determination. Eagerness
should be affected by an agent’s feeling in the past several
rounds and in the last run as well. Eagerness acts as an in-
dicator of the current supply and demand relationship from
the agent’s own point of view.
3 Agents for Sequential Vickrey Auctions
with Homogeneous Goods
When we look on a single Vickrey auctions as a double
auction where many buyers submit their bids and only one
seller (auctioneer) stays in the market without giving any
asks, it is meaningful to introduce the agents from CDAs
into the sequential Vickrey auctions. Certainly, we cannot
simply consider the sequential Vickrey auction as a spe-
cial case of CDAs, because the information available to the
agent, and hence the learning problem, is fundamentally dif-
ferent. In double auctions, an agent receives a stream of
data of asks, bids, and transactions. For sequential Vickrey
auctions, each agent is only aware of the lowest acceptable
price announced by the auctioneer, whether he is the win-
ner or not, and the price the winner must pay. The sealed
bidding nature prevents agents from observing competitors’
bids. Hence all the agents in sealed-bid auctions are only
able to infer and learn useful information once the auction
has ended.
In this Section, we describe how we revise ZI-C, ZIP,
GD, and AA strategies for sequential Vickrey auctions from
the perspective of buyer agents.
3.1 ZI-C Buyer Agents
For a ZI-C buyer agent i, he will generate his bid which
is a random value from the range [Plowest, vik].
3.2 ZIP Buyer Agents
Since all the buyer agents in the sequential Vickrey auc-
tions will not submit a bid lower than the lowest acceptable
price Plowest, it is reasonable to set a lower bound Plowest
to the transaction price in the last round and the last bid in
the last round.
In the Vickrey auction, each agent submits his bid to the
auctioneer in a secret way and the winner is the one who
submits the highest bid and pays the second highest bid as
the transaction price, Pt. Therefore, the value transaction
price Pt is different from the actual value of the highest bid
Phighest. Only the winner agent will know the exact value
of Phighest. The rest agents only know that the value of
Pt and the relationship of Phighest > Pt. The unknown
value of Phighest will bring difficulty to the adjustment of
the profit margin. For the winner agent, he will use the
same way to adjust the profit margin as described by Cliff
and Bruten [3]. For the rest agents, we divide them into
three categories which are different from the revisions by
Bagnall and Toft [2]. One is risk-averse who always try
to avoid the risk of losing the next auction by increasing
the target price, denoted as ZIPra. Another is risk-seeking
who still want to lower the target price so as to pursue high
profit in each auction, denoted as ZIPrs. The third cate-
gory is risk-neutral who will not change the target price and
is denoted as ZIPrn. Here we focus on the risk-averse ZIP
buyer agents in the sequential Vickrey auctions. For the per-
formance of risk-seeking and risk-neutral ZIP buyers, it is
still an interesting issue in our future work.
3.3 GD Buyer Agents
GD agents for CDAs form a strategy based on the re-
cent history of bids and asks. However, because it is not
available for each agent to know the rejected bids in Vick-
rey auctions, the belief function becomes invalid in Vickrey
auction. In order to solve this problem, the updated belief
function has been proposed and demonstrated to be effec-
tive [2]. We follow their updated belief function to imple-
ment GD agents in our sequential Vickrey auctions.
3.4 AA Buyer Agents
The value of eagerness for AA agents is formed on the
basis of the amount of transactions in several rounds or in
consecutive runs. This is the same in the sequential Vickrey
auctions. As to the heuristic rules to compute the bids, two
thresholds α and ω are to be set.
In sequential Vickrey auctions, the threshold α has to be
removed since there are no asks. In addition, the threshold
ω has to be removed because all the bids from other agents
in the current round are invisible to the agent. The available
equation to compute bid in this situation is bid = vik −
(vik−Pll)×R3. Here vik is the reservation price, Pll is the
lower range of acceptable prices in the market, and R3 is a
random real number.
In such sequential Vickrey auctions, repeated competi-
tion occurs for all agents. Hence eagerness can be kept for
AA buyer agents because there is trading history for the AA
agents to compute eagerness as in CDAs. In order to re-
vise the AA strategy in a meaningful way and let it work
properly, the random value of R3 should be replaced by the
meaningful value of eagerness; Pll should be replaced by
introducing a variable, Pthresh. The value of Pthresh is ad-
justed with different values of eagerness by employing three
fuzzy logic rules, shown in Figure 1.
IF Feager is close to 1.0 THEN Pthresh is a small value;
IF Feager is close to 0.0 THEN Pthresh is a large value;
IF Feager is in-between THEN Pthresh is a medium
value;
Figure 1. The fuzzy rule base for adjusting
Pthresh.
The performance of ZI-C, ZIP, and GD has been ex-
tensively evaluated in the literature. Nevertheless, the is-
sues of whether these adaptive agents can still work well in
agent-based sequential Vickrey auctions, and which adap-
tive agent performs superiorly under different market situa-
tions, are interesting questions to be addressed. The exper-
imental results below demonstrate the trend of the agent’s
profit with different strategies under various market envi-
ronments.
4 Experimental Evaluation of the Adaptive
Buyer Agents in the Sequential Vickrey
Auctions
To evaluate the performance of agents employing the
adaptive strategies and the dominant strategy, we design
two sets of experiments respectively. In the first set of ex-
periments, the profits gained by agents using strategy X are
compared. X can be ZI-C, ZIP, GD, and the dominant strat-
egy Sdomi, where ZI-C, ZIP, and GD are the most widely
cited strategies for agents based CDAs. In the second set of
experiments, AA is added into the competition with ZI-C,
ZIP, GD, and Sdomi.
4.1 Experimental Setup
In each round, a buyer is endowed with one unit of the
goods whose reservation price is independently and uni-
formly drawn from [3.1, 3.3]. The value of the lowest ac-
ceptable price of the market, Plowest, is randomly generated
from the range [1.1, 1.3] and broadcast to all the agents. The
thinking time that a buyer agent is allowed to elapse before
submitting a bid is specified as a randomly distributed vari-
able with a range [1, 2000]. The fixed deadline to terminate
a round is 20000 time units. In order to measure how well an
agent performs in the sequential Vickrey auctions, we evalu-
ate his performance by the profit he gains. For a buyer i, the
total profit on all t units bought in a run is
∑t
k=1(vik−Pik)
where vik is the reservation price and Pik is the value of the
transaction price. In the sequential Vickrey auctions, Pik
is determined by the value of the second highest bid. An
agent’s profit is calculated as the sum of the total profits in
1000 runs.
In the first set of experiments, there are three different
stages. In the first stage, there are totally 1000 runs where
in each run, 10 rounds are implemented one after another.
In each round, many buyer agents compete for one single
unit of the good. Each buyer wants to buy one unit of the
good in each round. For example, in the first round of the
first run, 20 buyers compete for one unit of the good. Finally
one buyer makes a transaction successfully. Then this buyer
will leave the current run. In the second round of the run,
the rest 19 buyers will continue to buy what they desire to
buy in the following 9 rounds. After 10 rounds are finished,
another run will begin and 20 buyers will reenter the market.
Therefore, the competition during these 1000 runs in the
first stage is very ferocious.
After these 1000 runs, we increase the amount of rounds
per run to be 20. This means that all the 20 buyer agents
need to compete for 20 units of the goods in one run. There
are altogether 1000 runs serially. It is obvious that in these
1000 runs, the competition is not as ferocious as the previ-
ous 1000 runs.
In the final stage, there are 40 rounds in each run. Hence,
all the 20 buyers are provided 40 units of the good to buy
while the buyers only desire to buy 20 units in all. Any
buyer can take his time to buy the unit he desires. The com-
petition is not ferocious at all.
In the second set of experiments, there are three stages
as well which are similar to those in the first set of exper-
iments. The difference is that there are 5 different kinds
of buyer agents and each kind has 5 buyer agents. Conse-
quently, the amount of rounds or demand in each run is 10,
25, and 50 every 1000 runs.
4.2 Experimental Results in the First Set
of Experiments
Figure 2(a) shows the profit for ZI-C, ZIP, GD, and
Sdomi buyer agents in the sequential Vickrey auctions. It
can be observed that when the amount of rounds in each
run is only 10, Sdomi agents and ZIP agents perform the
best when compared with ZI-C and GD agents.
If we take a look at Figure 2(b), it is shown that the
amount of transactions achieved by Sdomi agents is the
largest. The good profit of the Sdomi agents comes from
this large amount of transactions and a good profit in each
transaction. The large amount of transactions is determined
by the strategy itself. Based on the strategy of the Sdomi
agent, the agent will submit his bid, which is equal to his
true reservation price. Therefore, the Sdomi agent will grab
more opportunities to make transactions than other agents
who tell lies if their reservation prices are the same. On the
other hand, the transaction price is determined by the sec-
ond highest bid submitted by another agent instead of the
highest bid itself. This means that the profit for the winner
is not determined by the winner himself, which is equal to
various types of agents. Therefore the profit of Sdomi agents
is one of the best in the first stage of the experiments since
they have more opportunities to win and consequently gain
a good profit in the end.
The performance of ZI-C agents is the worst in the first
stage of the experiments. The amount of transactions of
ZI-C agents is the lowest as well. The lowest amount of
transactions means that the bids submitted by ZI-C agents
10 20 40
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
2200
2400
2600
2800
3000
3200
3400
3600
4 kinds of buyers
the amount of rounds per run=10~40
pr
of
it
 
 
ZI−C
ZIP
GD
Domi
(a) the profit
10 20 40
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
5500
4 kinds of buyers
the amount of rounds per run=10~40
tra
ns
ac
tio
n 
am
ou
nt
 
 
ZI−C
ZIP
GD
Domi
(b) the amount of transactions
Figure 2. Buyers adopting ZI-C, ZIP, GD, and
Sdomi strategies compete with each other in
the sequential Vickrey auctions. In every
1000 runs, there are 10, 20, or 40 rounds.
are not high enough to win a lot of transactions. In fact,
in a very competitive market where the transaction price is
determined by others, it has been illustrated by Figure 2 that
the most important thing is to grab more transactions. As a
result, the performance of ZI-C agents cannot be very good.
When the amount of rounds is 20 or 40, the profit of
Sdomi buyer agents is the worst. The reason is as follows.
When the amount of rounds is 20 or 40, every buyer agent
has the opportunity to buy what they want. ZIP and GD
agents have the ability to learn and behave adaptively to the
market. The bids submitted by them are usually very low
compared with those submitted by Sdomi agents. Hence
ZIP, GD, or ZI-C agents will take enough profitable trans-
actions and improve their profits. Moreover Sdomi agents
are more liable to take those poor transactions because they
always submit their true reservation prices. This will leave
other profitable transaction opportunities to ZIP, GD, or ZI-
C agents. All these will eventually lead to the loss of the
profit of Sdomi agents. In these two stages, compared with
ZIP and GD agents, ZI-C agents achieve a very good per-
formance. The reason is that the transaction price is decided
by the second highest bid which is most likely submitted by
ZIP or GD agents. Since ZIP and GD agents are adaptive
and submit low bids in order to benefit themselves, these
low bids will benefit ZI-C agents at the same time. Further-
more, ZI-C agents will not be disturbed by the bids of Sdomi
agents while GD and ZIP agents do.
Throughout these three stages, the profit of ZIP and GD
agents are neither the best nor the worst. The reason behind
is that they can behave adaptively to the dynamic market by
adjusting their bids from time to time. Nevertheless, in such
Vickrey auctions, the transaction price is determined by the
second highest bid. If these adaptive agents submit a high
bid, they are more liable to grab more transaction opportu-
nities but the profit in each transaction will be probably low
unless the second highest bid is very small. If these agents
submit a low bid aiming to improve the profit in each trans-
action, their opportunities to win will be low and if they lose
their low bid will benefit other agents. In the end, this will
lead to the profit of these adaptive agents to be not so high.
4.3 Experimental Results in the Second
Set of Experiments
When we add AA buyer agents into the market, the re-
sult shown in Figure 3(a) is quite similar with that of Figure
2(a). If there are only 10 rounds per run, the profit of AA,
ZIP, and Sdomi agents in Figure 3(a) are the best while ZI-
C agents perform the worst as in Figure 2(a). AA agents
perform very well because the agents can know whether it
is difficult for them to buy the goods by means of eager-
ness. Consequently they will adjust the value of Pthresh
according to the dynamic market environments. Therefore
the effectiveness of eagerness is demonstrated by the good
performance of AA agents. The reason for the good per-
formance of Sdomi agents and the bad performance of ZI-C
agents is similar to that in Section 4.2.
If there are 25 rounds or 50 rounds in each run, the profit
of the AA agents is still very good compared with other
agents. The outstanding performance of the AA agents
again results from eagerness and Pthresh. In this situa-
tion, the value of eagerness is close to 1.0 which tells the
agent that it is now easy for him to have transactions and he
should be eager for more profit in each transaction. In addi-
tion, eagerness will guide the AA agent to adjust the value
of Pthresh to become smaller. Eventually the agent will
generate a small bid which will leave a lot of profit to him-
self in each transaction. It is also true that such small bid
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Figure 3. Buyers adopting ZI-C, ZIP, GD,
Sdomi, AA strategies compete with each other
in the sequential Vickrey auctions. In every
1000 runs, there are 10, 25, or 50 rounds.
may sometimes benefit other agents, such as ZI-C agents,
which is shown in Figure 3(a) with demand = 50. Finally,
the AA agents and ZI-C agents will not be affected by the
Sdomi agents. However, ZIP agents and GD agents are still
disturbed by the Sdomi agents especially when the Sdomi
agents won the previous rounds of transactions.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We present how to revise ZI-C, ZIP, GD, and AA strate-
gies such that they can work properly in the sequential Vick-
rey auctions. Experimental results show that when it is dif-
ficult to have transactions, the performance of ZI-C agents
is the worst; otherwise Sdomi agents perform worst. Some-
times ZI-C agents perform best if it is easy to trade because
ZIP and GD agents are affected by the Sdomi agents and
lose profit. To test the performance of AA agents in the
sequential Vickrey auctions, we put ZI-C, ZIP, GD, Sdomi,
and AA agents in the market and carry out another set of ex-
periments. The performance of AA agents is demonstrated
to be very well compared with other agents. There are more
interesting questions to be addressed, i.e., how the ZIP or
GD agents are disturbed by other agents in the market? in
which scenarios the performance of ZIP, GD, or AA agents
can be the best. We shall investigate more on these unad-
dressed questions in the future.
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